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Antenuptial Agreements in Pennsylvania: A
Drafter's Nightmare?
Of course I love you dear . . . Of course our marriage will be forever . . .
But honey, my attorney said that I ought to ask you to sign this agreement
just in case things don't work out . . . I told him it really wasn't necessary,
but you know how lawyers are.
INTRODUCTION
Diamonds may be forever, but marriages are not always quite as
resilient.' If the hypothetical speaker above is able to convince his
bride to sign an antenuptial agreement,2 there remains considera-
ble debate as to whether the agreement will be binding upon the
parties and govern their respective rights and responsibilities in
the event of divorce or separation.
Although antenuptial agreements in contemplation of the death
of one of the spouses have long been enforceable in Pennsylvania,3
the enforceability of antenuptial agreements in contemplation of
divorce or separation has been the subject of on-going controversy
and uncertainty.' The already existing uncertainty surrounding
such agreements increased dramatically when the opinion in
Karkaria v. Karkaria' was rendered by Judge R. Stanton Wettick
of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas in March, 1988.0
1. In 1984, there were 2,477,000 marriages and 1,169,000 divorces in the United States.
See Statistical Abstract of the United States 1988, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of the Census (108th ed. 1988). The median duration of marriages in 1984 was 6.9 years. Id.
In Pennsylvania, there were 89,139 marriages and 40,153 divorces in 1985. See 1987 Penn-
sylvania Statistical Abstract, Office of Economic Policy, Planning and Research (July
1987).
2. Antenuptial agreements are called "prenuptial agreements" by some courts and
commentators. The terms are interchangeable, but for the sake of clarity, and because
Pennsylvania courts generally refer to such agreements as antenuptial agreements, this text
will refer to such agreements as antenuptial agreements.
3. As early as 1852, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the validity of an
antenuptial agreement. See Shoch v. Shoch's Executors, 19 Pa. 252 (1852).
4. See infra notes 45-94 and accompanying text.
5. 136 P.L.J. 158 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1988)(Wettick, A.J.).
6. Id. The uncertainty was aptly expressed by one commentator when she stated that:
"[Karkaria was] calculated to give family law lawyers heartburn and sleepless nights. This
case had all family lawyers who ever drafted a good antenuptial agreement for a client ..
close [to] calling their insurance carriers." Miller, Karkaria: A New and Uncertain Test for
Pennsylvania Antenuptial Agreements, 12 PA. FAMILY LAW. No. 9 at 29 (June-July 1988)
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Karkaria announces a new test to determine the validity of ante-
nuptial agreements 7 entered into following the effective date of
Pennsylvania's 1980 Divorce Code8. While the ramifications of
Judge Wettick's opinion could be considerable,' it may be some
time before Pennsylvania's appellate courts squarely address the
issue. Until then, it is likely that the controversy and uncertainty
will continue.
The validity of antenuptial agreements which contemplate sepa-
ration or divorce involves more than a mere academic discussion. It
is of practical importance to any attorney who is requested by a
client to draft an antenuptial agreement which contains provisions
relating to separation or divorce and which is to be enforceable in
Pennsylvania. Indeed, it is of extreme importance to those attor-
neys who have, subsequent to the enactment of the 1980 Divorce
Code, drafted antenuptial agreements under the presumption that
they had written binding contracts and erroneously assured their
clients of as much.
With these practical ramifications in mind, this comment shall
review the relevant case law and legislation in Pennsylvania deal-
ing with the validity of antenuptial agreements. The analysis will
begin with a discussion of the law relating to the noncontroversial
variety of antenuptial agreements-those which provide for and
regulate the disposition of property in the event of death. The
comment will then shift its focus to the more volatile hybrid: ante-
nuptial agreements which are drafted in contemplation of separa-
tion or divorce.
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH
Antenuptial agreements in contemplation of death are contracts
between prospective husbands and wives which are entered into
before marriage, but in contemplation and in consideration of mar-
riage. Antenuptial agreements usually contain provisions which al-
ter or extinguish the statutory rights of the surviving spouse in the
estate of the deceased spouse.'" In other words, antenuptial agree-
[hereinafter Miller].
7. See infra notes 70-88 and accompanying text.
8. Pennsylvania's 1980 Divorce Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit 23, § 101 (Purdon Supp.
1988), was enacted on April 2, 1980, and became effective ninety days thereafter.
9. One commentator observed that: "Because the opinion is so well-written and well-
researched, it is likely to be widely read and highly persuasive to other Pennsylvania trial
courts and appellate courts." Miller, supra note 6, at 30.
10. A. MOMJIAN & N. PERLBERGER, PENNSYLVANIA FAMILY LAW § 7.1.1 at 3 (1978) [here-
Vol. 27:769
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ments regulate the financial rights and interests of one or both of
the parties.1"
Historically, the validity of an antenuptial contract has de-
pended primarily upon the presence of one of two factors. 2 The
agreement must have contained either a reasonable provision for
the intended spouse or a full and fair disclosure of the other
party's worth.13 If an antenuptial agreement contained a reasona-
ble provision for the intended spouse, the agreement would be up-
held even if there had been less than a full and fair financial dis-
closure. 4 Conversely, where there had been a full and fair
disclosure, antenuptial agreements have been upheld despite the
fact that the provision for the intended spouse was unreasonable.' 5
inafter MOMJIAN & PERLBERGER].
11. See Barnhart v. Barnhart, 376 Pa. 44, 53, 101 A.2d 904 (1954). Some of the reasons
for entering into an antenuptial agreement are:
1. To protect preexisting assets from estate claims;
2. To protect income and assets, acquired both before and during the marriage, in
case of separation or divorce;
3. To prearrange the personal relationship between the prospective spouses;
4. To protect family businesses, professional practices, and pension benefits;
5. To firmly fix economic rights and obligations after marriage between the prospec-
tive spouses (sometimes including the contribution of each spouse to expenses and
tax obligations); and
6. To assure fair and equal treatment of children from previous marriages.
Hofstein and Bell, Prenuptial Agreements: Legal Issues Relating to the Enforceability of
Antenuptial Agreements, 1988-453 PENNSYLVANIA BAR INSTITUTE 33, 35 (1988) [hereinafter
Hofstein and Bell].
12. See In re Estate of Geyer, 516 Pa. 492, 500-01, 533 A.2d 423, 427 (1987); Friedman
Estate, 483 Pa. 614, 398 A.2d 615 (1979); In re Hillegass, 431 Pa. 144, 244 A.2d 672 (1968);
Kaufmann Estate, 404 Pa. 131, 171 A.2d 48 (1961); Zeigler Estate, 381 Pa. 436, 446, 113
A.2d 271, 273 (1955); Belsky v. Belsky, 196 Pa. Super. 374, 376-77, 175 A.2d 348, 349-50
(1961); Emery Estate, 362 Pa. 142, 146, 66 A.2d 262 (1949); Groff's Estate, 341 Pa. 105, 112,
19 A.2d 107, 111 (1941); Flannery's Estate, 315 Pa. 576, 580, 173 A.2d 303 (1934). In 1987,
the Geyer court reaffirmed this principle when it quoted In re Hillegass as follows:
Parties to an antenuptial Agreement providing for the disposition of their respective
estates do not deal at arm's length, but stand in a relation of mutual confidence and
trust that calls for the highest degree of good faith and a reasonable provision for the
surviving spouse, or in the absence of such a provision a full and fair disclosure of all
pertinent facts and circumstances.
In re Estate of Geyer, 516 Pa. at 501, 533 A.2d at 427 (quoting In re Hillegass, 431 Pa. at
149, 244 A.2d at 675). In re Hillegass has recently been called "the leading decision in
[Pennsylvania] concerning the interpretation of antenuptial agreements". Simeone v. Sime-
one, 551 A.2d 219, 221 (1988).
13. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Groffs Estate, 341 Pa. 105, 112, 19 A.2d 107 (1941). The Groff's court
stated that "[ain antenuptial agreement will not be declared invalid, even if full information
is not given to the wife of the husband's estate, providing that there is a reasonable allow-
ance made for her." Id. (quoting Gorback's Estate, 96 Pa. Super. 527, 529 (1929)).
15. See, e.g., Vallish Estate, 431 Pa. 88, 94, 244 A.2d 745 (1968)("Under our case law,
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 1987 plurality opinion in In re
Estate of Geyer"' seems to mandate a third requirement, i.e., any
agreement seeking to change the statutory rights of the parties
must include a full and fair disclosure of such statutory rights. 7
A. Reasonable Provision for the Intended Spouse
The determination of whether an antenuptial agreement con-
tains a reasonable provision for the intended spouse requires an
evaluation of the circumstances existing at the time of the agree-
ment and not by hindsight.18 Hindsight may not be used to set
aside, as being inadequate, the provision for the spouse if such pro-
vision was adequate when made. 9 The true test of the adequacy of
a provision for an intended spouse is whether the provision is suffi-
cient to enable him/her to live comfortably and in substantially the
same or in a better manner than that which he/she enjoyed prior
to marriage.2 The reasonableness of a provision depends upon the
totality of all the facts and circumstances at the time of the agree-
ment, including the financial worth of each of the parties, the age
of the parties, their prior marital status, the number of children
each has, the intelligence of the parties, the extent to which each
spouse aided in the accumulation of the wealth, and the standard
of living the dependent spouse could reasonably expect to have
in view of the obvious absence of any provisions for Mrs. Vallish, unless a full disclosure was
made of decedents assets at the time of the agreement, this agreement would be invalid..
16. 516 Pa. 492, 506, 533 A.2d 423, 429-30 (1987).
17. Id. The Geyer court states as follows:
That public policy, a token of the solemnity of the matrimonial union, requires no
less than a condition that any agreement surrendering the right of a spouse to elect
against the will must be made under full knowledge of that right. We therefore think
it is fair and reasonable, as well as sound judicial policy, to require that any agree-
ment which seeks to change the duly enacted public policy of this Commonwealth
must be based on nothing less than full and fair disclosure. Such disclosure must
include both the general financial pictures of the parties involved, and evidence that
the parties are aware of the statutory rights which they are relinquishing.
Id. at 506, 533 A.2d at 429-30.
18. See Gula v. Gula, 551 A.2d 219, 223 (1988); Geyer, 516 Pa. at 501, 533 A.2d at 428;
In re Hillegass Estate, 431 Pa. 144, 244 A.2d 672 (1968); McGannon v. McGannon, 241 Pa.
Super. 45, 359 A.2d 431 (1976).
19. See MOMJIAN & PERLBERGER, supra note 10, § 7.1.2(d) at 6 (citing Kaufmann Es-
tate, 404 Pa. 131, 171 A.2d 48 (1961); Emery Estate, 66 A.2d 262, 362 Pa. 142 (1949)). See
also Geyer Estate, 516 Pa. at 503, 533 A.2d at 428 (inter vivos gifts received subsequent to
the date of the agreement are irrelevant).
20. See Estate of Geyer, 338 Pa. Super. 157, 487 A.2d 901 (1985); McClellan's Estate,
365 Pa. 401, 75 A.2d 595 (1950); Emery's Estate, 362 Pa. 142, 66 A.2d 262 (1949).
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during marriage. 2' The court will also determine whether provision
for the spouse was unreasonably disproportionate to the financial
wealth of the other spouse at the time of the antenuptial
agreement.
2
B. Full and Fair Financial Disclosure
In the alternative, a spouse may make a full and fair disclosure
of his or her financial status.2 The duty of disclosure in antenup-
tial agreements requires disclosure of all material circumstances
which bear upon the prospective agreement.2 Although the finan-
cial disclosure need not be exact,25 a mere description of assets
without disclosing the value of such assets has been held to be in-
sufficient to satisfy the full and fair disclosure requirement.26 The
prudent draftsperson will probably avoid costly litigation relative
21. See In re Hillegass, 431 Pa. at 150, 244 A.2d at 676; see also Geyer, 516 Pa. at 500-
01, 533 A.2d at 427 (quoting In re Hillegass with favor); Gula, 551 A.2d at 223 (quoting
Hillegass and Geyer) ; Vallish's Estate, 431 Pa. 88, 244 A.2d 745 (1968)(parties were both
married previously and each had children from previous marriages); Gelb's Estate, 425 Pa.
117, 228 A.2d 367 (1967)(quoting Kaufmann Estate, 404 Pa. 131, 171 A.2d 48 (1961), which
lists five factors to be considered when determining reasonableness); McCready's Estate, 316
Pa. 246, 175 A. 554 (1934)(parties were "advanced" in age, had separate children and sepa-
rate estates).
22. See, e.g., Gelb Estate, 425 Pa. 117, 228 A.2d 367 (1967); McClellan Estate, 365 Pa.
401, 75 A.2d 595 (1950).
23. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
24. See Vallish's Estate, 431 Pa. 88, 244 A.2d 745 (1968). Vallish quotes Shea's Ap-
peal, 121 Pa. 302, 15 A. 629 (1888) with approval as follows:
In Shea's Appeal 121 Pa. 302, 318, 319, 15 A. 629 (1888), this Court said: "The
relation [between betrothed persons] is one of such extreme mutual confidence that a
special duty of full disclosure arises which has no place in the ordinary contractual
relation. Thus, in the case of Kline v. Kline, 57 Pa. 120, we said: 'There is perhaps no
relation of life in which more unbounded confidence is reposed than in that existing
between parties who are betrothed to each other... To consider such persons as in
the same category with buyers and sellers, and to say that they are dealing at arms'
length, we think is a mistake. Surely when a man and woman are on the eve of mar-
riage, and it is proposed between them, as in this instance, to enter into an ante-
nuptial contract upon the subject of the enjoyment and disposition of their respective
estates, it is the duty of each to be frank and unreserved in the disclosure of all
circumstances materially bearing on the contemplated agreement.' We held that the
relation existing between betrothed persons was one of the confidential relations
which require uberrima fides in all transactions between them.
Vallish, 431 Pa. at 93, 244 A.2d at 747-48.
25. Hofstein and Bell, supra note 11, at - (citing In re Estate of Geyer, 516 Pa.
492, 533 A.2d 427 (1987)("[d]isclosure may be imprecise only to the extent that it does not
obscure the general financial resources of the parties.")). See also Gula v. Gula, 551 A.2d
324 (1988).
26. See MOMJIAN & PERLBERGER, supra note 10, § 7.1.2(e) at 7 (citing Warner's Estate,
210 Pa. 431, 59 A. 1113 (1904)).
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to disclosure by appending to the agreement a complete copy of his
client's financial statement and incorporating it by reference
thereto. Any material misrepresentation, whether intentional or
not, will cause the disclosure to fall short of the requirement."
When drafting antenuptial agreements, many attorneys have
tried to avoid these pitfalls by including clauses which, in one form
or another, state that each party has entered into the agreement
with full knowledge of, and after complete disclosure of, the nature
and value of the estate of the other.28 While it has been generally
held that such a recital is prima facie evidence of full and fair dis-
closure,29 it is a presumption which may be rebutted by extrinsic
evidence to the contrary.30 In any event, there is generally no duty
on the part of an intended spouse to inquire into the assets of the
other since he or she has a right to believe in the truth of the
other's representations."
C. Disclosure of Statutory Rights
As aforementioned, the opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in In re Estate of Geyer" seems to mandate what can be
characterized either as a third requirement or as an augmentation
of the already existing disclosure requirement.3 According to the
Geyer court, any agreement seeking to change the statutory rights
of the parties must include a full and fair disclosure of the statu-
tory rights to be affected. 4 For example, it may be necessary to
disclose that there is a statutory right for a spouse to elect against
the other spouse's will if, by the terms of the antenuptial agree-
ment, one or both of the parties waive that right.3 5
27. See McClellan Estate, 365 Pa. 401, 75 A.2d 595 (1950); Harris Estate, 431 Pa. 293,
245 A.2d 647 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1065 (1969).
28. See MOMJIAN & PERLBERGER, supra note 10, § 7.1.2(e) at 7.
29. Id. See also Vallish's Estate, 431 Pa. 88, 244 A.2d 745 (1968); Harris Estate, 431
Pa. 293, 245 A.2d 647 (1968); Gelb Estate, 425 Pa. 117, 228 A.2d 367 (1967); McClellan
Estate, 365 Pa. 401, 75 A.2d 595 (1950). But see Geyer v. Geyer, 516 Pa. 492, 506 n.10, 533
A.2d 423, 428 n.10 (1987)("We think the Superior Court's reliance on the documents self
serving statement regarding full and fair disclosure was misplaced. When the facts prove
that a person has been misled that person's contemporaneous recorded belief that she was
not misled is of no value.").
30. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
31. See MOMJIAN & PERLBERGER, supra note 10, § 7.1.2(b) at 4 (citing Flannery's Es-
tate, 315 Pa. 576, 173 A. 303 (1934); Warner's Estate, 210 Pa. 431, 59 A. 1113 (1904)).
32. 516 Pa. 492, 506, 533 A.2d 423, 429-30 (1987).
33. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.




It remains unclear, however, whether such a third requirement
really exists. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has declined to in-
terpret Geyer as requiring disclosure of statutory rights in every
antenuptial agreement. 6 Instead, the superior court has inter-
preted Geyer as meaning that the disclosure of statutory rights is
mandatory only to enforce an agreement in which the provisions
for the spouse are unreasonable.37 Despite the superior court's in-
terpretation, the prudent draftsperson should probably avoid the
risk of having an antenuptial invalidated by including a "Disclos-
ure of Statutory Rights" section which clearly sets forth all statu-
tory rights that are either waived or modified by the agreement.
D. Not an Arm's Length Transaction
An antenuptial agreement is presumptively binding on both par-
ties and can only be avoided by a litigant based upon clear and
convincing evidence that there is no provision for the dependent
spouse or that the provision was inadequate when the agreement
was entered into.38 However, since the relationship of prospective
spouses is one of "extreme mutual confidence,"3 9 antenuptial
agreements require the utmost good faith and a high degree of fair-
ness.40 When the relationship between the parties to an agreement
is one of trust and confidence, the normal arm's length bargaining
is not assumed,'4 1 and overreaching by the dominant party for his
or her benefit permits the aggrieved party to rescind the
transaction.2
Where a confidential relationship is proven to have existed, the
36. See Simeone v. Simeone, 551 A.2d 219, 221 (1988).
37. In Simeone, the superior court interpreted the holding in In re Estate of Geyer as:
"(1) the concept of 'full and fair disclosure' was expanded to include the disclosure of statu-
tory rights; and (2) the Hiflegass holding that antenuptial agreements are valid in the pres-
ence of either full and fair disclosure or a reasonable provision for the intended spouse
remains unchanged." Id. at 221.
38. See Slight Estate, 467 Pa. 619, 359 A.2d 773 (1976); Hillegass Estate, 431 Pa. 144,
244 A.2d 672 (1968); Vallish Estate, 431 Pa. 88, 244 A.2d 745 (1968); Kaufmann Estate, 404
Pa. 131, 171 A.2d 48 (1961); Barnhart v. Barnhart, 376 Pa. 44, 101 A.2d 904 (1954).
39. Groff's Estate, 341 Pa. 105, 19 A.2d 107 (1941).
40. See In re Estate of Geyer, 338 Pa. Super. 157, 487 A.2d 901, 905 (1987); Barnhart
v. Barnhart, 376 Pa. 44, 101 A.2d 904 (1954); Hillegass' Estate, 431 Pa. 144, 244 A.2d 672
(1968); Kline v. Kline, 57 Pa. 120, 98 A. 202 (1868).
41. See Bierer's Appeal, 92 Pa. 265 (1879); Kline v. Kline, 57 Pa. 120, 98 A. 202 (1868);
Vallish's Estate, 431 Pa. 88, 244 A.2d 745 (1968).
42. See Frowen v. Blank, 493 Pa. 137, 425 A.2d 412, 416 (1981). This is so because the
presence of a confidential relationship negates the assumption that each party is acting in
their own best interest. Id.
1989
Duquesne Law Review
party desiring to enforce the terms of an agreement has the burden
of proving that there has not been a breach of the trust inherent in
such a relationship. ' s In fact, it has been held that in a marital
relationship, the slightest trace of undue influence or unfair advan-
tage will be sufficient for the court to grant relief to the injured
party." Therefore, a prudent lawyer who represents the financially
secure party ought to advise his client that if his or her intended
spouse is not represented by counsel, the client ought to recom-
mend to the intended spouse that he or she should consult with
counsel before signing the antenuptial agreement. If each party has
consulted with their own counsel, the agreement should state that
fact.
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IN CONTEMPLATION OF SEPARATION OR
DIVORCE
"Historically, the courts of this country have treated antenuptial
agreements drafted in contemplation of separation or divorce quite
differently from those drafted in contemplation of the death of one
of the spouses. ' '4 5 Until modified by the 1970 landmark case of
Posner v. Posner," the common law rule had been that agreements
made in contemplation of divorce were virtually always invalid be-
cause such agreements were against the public policy of not en-
couraging divorce.4 7 The post-1970 case law reflects the states'
change of policy'" whereby the states are not concerned with pre-
43. Id. at 144, 425 A.2d at 417 (citing Scott Estate, 455 Pa. 429, 316 A.2d 883 (1974);
Ruggieri v. West Forum Corp., 444 Pa. 175, 282 A.2d 304 (1971); McClatchy's Estate, 433
Pa. 232, 249 A.2d 325 (1969); Kees v. Green, 365 Pa. 368, 75 A.2d 602 (1950); Brooks v.
Conston, 356 Pa. 69, 51 A.2d 684 (1947)).
44. Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 128-29, 224 A.2d 164 (1966). The court held as
follows:
A transaction between persons so situated as wife and husband is watched with
extreme jealously and solicitude, and if there be found the slightest trace of undue
influence or unfair advantage, redress will be given to the injured party ... Owing to
the near connection between the parties ... , the transaction in itself is considered so
suspicious as to cast the burden of proof upon the person who seeks to support it, to
show that he had taken no advantage of his influence or knowledge, and that the
arrangement is fair and conscientious.
Id. See also supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
45. See Karkaria v. Karkaria, 136 P.L.J. 158, 161 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1988)(Wettick, A.J.).
46. 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), reversed on other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972).
47. See Hofstein and Bell, supra note 11, at 47.
48. The change of policy in Pennsylvania became statutory as well as judicial when
the Pennsylvania legislature included § 401(e)(2) in the 1980 Divorce Code wherein
"[p]roperty excluded by valid agreement of the parties entered into before during or after
the marriage" is excluded from the definition of marital property. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
Vol. 27:769
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serving a marriage if the relationship is irretrievably broken."
In Pennsylvania, the courts have upheld the validity of antenup-
tial agreements in contemplation of divorce in numerous cases de-
cided during the 1980's.50 In addition, the Pennsylvania legislature
specifically recognized the validity of antenuptial agreements5'
when it enacted the 1980 Divorce Code.52 Thus, both case law and
statutory law"s provide ample authority in support of the validity
of antenuptial agreements in contemplation of divorce.
According to Karkaria, the state's concern for the financial well-
being of divorced spouses has become the "critical factor." This is
true because the "public policy consideration" with respect to not
encouraging divorce is no longer considered a viable rationale for
invalidating antenuptial agreements in contemplation of divorce. 54
Although the financial security of divorced spouses had been a sec-
ond public policy consideration in many pre-1970 cases in sister
states,55 the removal of the "encouragement of divorce" issue
brought the "financial security" issue to the forefront of the debate
surrounding the enforceability of antenuptial agreements in con-
templation of divorce.56 In the words of Judge Wettick in
Karkaria:
The issue is usually framed in terms of whether an agreement waiving rights
upon divorce or separation will be enforced so long as it meets the stan-
dards that have traditionally governed antenuptial agreements in contem-
plation of death-full disclosure of financial worth and no showing of fraud,
duress, or undue influence in the procurement of the agreement-or
whether the public policy considerations for providing equitable distribu-
tit. 23, § 401(e)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1988).
49. See Karkaria, 136 P.L.J. at 161 (citing Frey v. Frey, 471 A.2d 705 (Md. 1984);
Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 1984); Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1987);
Marshall v. Marshall, 477 A.2d 833 (N.J.Ch. 1987); Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782 (Ind.
1985); and Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810 (Mass. 1981)).
50. See Gula v. Gula, 551 A.2d 324 (1988); Simeone v. Simeone, 551 A.2d 219 (1988);
Laub v. Laub, 351 Pa. Super. 110, 505 A.2d 290 (1986); Fox v. Fox, 114 Mont. Co. L.R. 145
(1985).
51. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(e)(2)(Purdon Supp. 1988), which excludes from
the definition of marital property all "property excluded by valid agreement of the parties
entered into before, during or after the marriage." Id. (emphasis added).
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 101 et. seq. (Purdon Supp. 1988).
53. The Pennsylvania Divorce Code does not contain any similar provisions relating to
a waiver of alimony, alimony pendente lite or spousal support. Recent appellate cases make
no distinction between a waiver of property rights and a waiver of alimony pendente lite,
spousal support or alimony. See Hofstein & Bell, supra note 11, at 49 (citing Laub, 351 Pa.
Super at 115, 505 A.2d at 293; Fox v. Fox, 114 Mont. Co. L.R. 145 (1985)).
54. Karkaria v. Karkaria, 136 P.L.J. 158, 161 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1988).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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tion and support will bar the enforcement of the agreement. 7
Some courts, citing this public policy consideration, have refused
to enforce a provision in an antenuptial agreement whereby a
spouse has waived alimony or alimony pendente lite.5 8 Other
courts have been willing to enforce provisions wherein a spouse has
waived a statutory right to support provided that certain substan-
tive fairness standards have been observed. 9 For example, the Col-
orado Supreme Court opined that even if a maintenance provision
contained in an antenuptial agreement was perfectly reasonable at
the time it was drafted, the purpose of the Colorado Divorce Code,
which is to mitigate potential harm to a spouse caused by the dis-
solution of marriage, 0 militates against the enforcement of such a
provision if its terms have become unconscionable at the time of
the dissolution of the marriage.1 That court viewed as unconscion-
able a maintenance agreement which rendered the spouse without
the means of reasonable support.62 The Karkaria court concluded
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 44 (S.D. 1979); In re Marriage
of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973); Holliday v. Holliday,
358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978); Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); Con-
nolly v. Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44 (S.D. 1978)).
59. Id. at 162 (citing Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982)(public policy
expressed in Divorce Code bars enforcement of antenuptial agreement which would produce
unconscionable result)).
60. See Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982). See a similar provision con-
tained in Pennsylvania's Divorce Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 102(a)(4)(Purdon Supp.
1988), wherein it is stated that the policy of the Commonwealth is to "[m]itigate the harm
to the spouses and their children caused by the legal dissolution of the marriage." Id.
61. Newman, 653 P.2d at 734.
62. Id. Other cases and parenthetical comments relating to the conscionability of
maintenance provisions were set forth by the court in Karkaria, including the following:
Hill v. Hill, 356 N.W.2d 49 (Minnesota Court of Appeals, 1984)(the Court said that in
"weighing the public policy interest in the welfare of a spouse against the rights of
parties to freely contract, we conclude that there must be reserved to the court at the
time of a marriage dissolution the power to review maintenance provisions of an ante-
nuptial agreement to determine the conscionability of those provisions" p. 57"); Pos-
ner v. Posner, supra (the Florida Supreme Court held that antenuptial agreements
governing alimony would be subject to modification upon a showing of changed cir-
cumstances); Marschall v. Marschall, supra (the New Jersey Supreme Court in refus-
ing to enforce an antenuptial agreement governing alimony proposed a "fairness" test
that would take into account the standard of living during the marriage, the standard
of living prior to the marriage, and other factors such as the length of the marriage,
and whether the marriage produced children); McHugh v. McHugh, 436 A.2d 8 (Con-
necticut Supreme Court, 1980)(antenuptial agreement would not be enforced where
"the circumstances of the parties at the time of the dissolution are so far beyond the
contemplation of the parties at the time the agreement was made as to make enforce-
ment of the agreement work an injustice" p. 112); Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546
(Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1986)(agreement "should in some manner appropriate to
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that "antenuptial agreements waiving support rights are carefully
scrutinized in order to preserve the strong public policy in favor of
protecting a divorced spouse who lacks sufficient property or job
skills to provide for his or her needs."63
Provisions of antenuptial agreements which govern property
rights upon divorce have received more favorable treatment by the
courts than those which modify or waive support rights. " This is
particularly so where the agreement seeks to protect only that
property which the spouse brought into the marriage or acquired
by gift or inheritance. 5 Public policy is concerned with property
that was acquired through the contribution of either spouse during
the course of the marriage,6 6 not separate property. It is possible,
however, that provisions of antenuptial agreements excluding
property acquired during the marriage are subject to "a higher
standard of scrutiny.
'6 7
Until October, 1988, no Pennsylvania appellate court had ad-
dressed the validity of an antenuptial agreement in contemplation
of divorce entered into subsequent to the enactment of Pennsylva-
nia's 1980 Divorce Code. 8 Accordingly, the Karkaria court stated
the circumstances of the parties take into account that each spouse contributes to the
prosperity of the marriage by his or her efforts" p. 551); Frey v. Frey, supra (Mary-
land Court of Appeals requires that the agreement be fair and equitable); Gross v.
Gross, supra (Ohio Supreme Court requires that the agreement be conscionable and
reasonable-"The trial court, in the determination of the issue of conscionability and
reasonableness of the provision for sustenance and maintenance of a spouse at the
time of divorce, shall utilize the same factors that govern the allowance of alimony..
. p. 509-10); Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986)(provisions
eliminating alimony are not binding on a court but serve "only as a recommendation"
p. 419); Osborne v. Osborne, supra (Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the
agreement must be fair and reasonable at the time of the court proceeding); and
Lewis v. Lewis, 14 Family Law Rptr. 1161 (Hawaii Supreme Court, 1988)(agreement
may not permit a post-divorce economic situation that is unjustly disproportion-
ate-this determination may be made only by considering all relevant factors and
circumstances at the time of the divorce).
Karkaria, 136 P.L.J. at 162-63.
63. Id. at 163.
64. Id. See, e.g., Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1987); In the Matter of the
Estate of Crawford, 730 P.2d 675 (Wash. 1986); Hill v. Hill, 356 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984); Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 1984); Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo.
1982); Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986).
65. See supra note 64.
66. Id.
67. Karkaria, 136 P.L.J. at 163.
68. See Simeone v. Simeone, 551 A.2d 219 (1988). Pennsylvania's Divorce Code may
be found at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 101 et. seq. (Purdon Supp. 1988). Karkaria distin-
guished the holdings in Laub v. Laub, 351 Pa. Super. 110, 505 A.2d 290 (1986) and Wolfe v.
Wolfe, 341 Pa. Super. 313, 491 A.2d 281 (1985), as only addressing the impact of antenuptial
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that the case law offered no guidance as to the validity of the pro-
visions of an antenuptial agreement entered into after enactment
of the Divorce Code. 9 Without higher court precedent, Judge Wet-
tick proceeded to announce the standards by which such agree-
ments will be judged, at least in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
First, the judge concluded that antenuptial agreements that do not
encourage divorce unless the marriage is irretrievably broken do
not violate the public policy favoring marriage.70 Second, Judge
Wettick concluded "that antenuptial agreements, affecting prop-
erty and support rights upon divorce, will be subject to the same
procedural standards of fairness that govern antenuptial agree-
ments affecting rights upon death."' 71 Judge Wettick's third conclu-
sion was his most dramatic pronouncement and the one which has
caused the most controversy among Pennsylvania's family law
practitioners. He stated as follows:
The remaining issue is whether Pennsylvania will require that antenuptial
agreements governing property and support rights be substantively fair. We
conclude that Pennsylvania should follow the case law of other jurisdictions
that most carefully scrutinizes these agreements, because an important pur-
pose of "divorce reform" within Pennsylvania was to confer financial bene-
fits on divorced spouses who require support or whose noneconomic contri-
butions contributed to the parties accumulation of assets.2
In support of his conclusion, Judge Wettick reviewed the prior
law in Pennsylvania, which mandated that the division of property
acquired during marriage be based entirely on title,7 and which
precluded a homemaker from receiving alimony following the dis-
solution of a marriage.74 However, under the prior law, the depen-
dant spouse did have the comfort of knowing that he or she would
agreements that were entered into prior to the enactment of the Divorce Code.
69. Karkaria, 136 P.L.J. at 167.
70. Id.
71. Id. "The statutory rights governing support and the distribution of property in the
Divorce Code are at least as significant as those statutory rights governing inheritance, so
the same procedural safeguards should be applied." Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 168. Judge Wettick explained further:
If the property was titled only in the name of one spouse, upon divorce the other
spouse had no claim to the property in the absence of a showing that his or her funds
were used to acquire the property. Thus, upon divorce, a homemaker and primary
caretaker of the children frequently had no claim to substantial assets acquired dur-
ing the marriage because the other spouse, as the primary wage earner, used his or




always be entitled to support as long as that spouse had done
nothing which would constitute a ground for the other spouse to
seek a divorce based on fault.75 This gave tremendous leverage to
the spouse who was not seeking to remarry." The spouse who
wanted to remarry had to offer a property settlement which was
agreeable to the other spouse. "
This system proved to be inequitable to both parties. Neither
could remarry despite an irretrievable breakdown of the mar-
riage." The dependent spouse, even if the victim of emotional or
physical abuse, could not terminate the marriage without forfeiting
support rights and all interest in any property which was titled in
the other spouse's name.' The Divorce Code of 1980 sought to cor-
rect these inequities by granting divorces regardless of fault, insti-
tuting a system of equitable distribution and allowing alimony
when necessary for the support of a dependent spouse. 0 The legis-
lative intent was, inter alia, to mitigate the harm to the spouses
and their children caused by the dissolution of the marriage" and
to "effectuate economic justice between the parties.""
According to Judge Wettick, parties, as a general rule, "may not
waive statutory protections unless there are significant policy con-
siderations favoring these waivers."' s8 Finding no such significant
policy considerations," the Karkaria court chose to follow the line
of cases which carefully scrutinizes the provisions of antenuptial
agreements governing support and alimony rights upon divorce. 5
In so doing, the court held that the agreement must be fair and
reasonable at the time of the proceeding at which alimony is
sought.8 6 In addition, the court held that a conscionability stan-
dard 7 must be applied with respect to equitable distribution, i.e.,
75. Id. "[U]nder prior law, no party could obtain a divorce except upon a showing of




78. Id. "[T]he cost of protecting [the dependent spouse] was high." Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 102(a)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1988).
82. See id. § 102(a)(6).
83. Karkaria, 136 P.L.J. at 169 (citing Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 331 A.2d 452
(1975); Resolute Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 423 Pa. 472, 224 A.2d 757 (1966)).
84. Id. at 170.
85. Id. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
86. Karkaria, 136 P.L.J. at 170.
87. The Karkaria court adopted the conscionability standard set forth in Button v.
Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 551-52 (Wis. 1986) (agreement should in some manner appropriate
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it "must be fair, in light of the circumstances, at the time of execu-
tion [and] at the time of the proceedings at which equitable distri-
bution is sought, the agreement must not provide a result which
was beyond the expectations of the parties at the time the agree-
ment was made.""8
The Karkaria decision was not appealed.89 Since the date of the
Karkaria holding, one appellate decision, Simeone v. Simeone,e°
has been rendered relating to antenuptial agreement in contempla-
tion of divorce." Interestingly, the Simeone court did not recog-
nize Judge Wettick's opinion in Karkaria. Instead, Simeone
merely made the usual inquiry into the reasonableness of the pro-
vision for the dependent spouse,92 determined that the husband
had made reasonable provision for the wife because the provision
was reasonable at the time the agreement was made,9 3 and, ac-
cordingly, held that the agreement was valid. 4
III. CONCLUSION
Until Karkaria is either unquestionably rejected or adopted, the
drafting of a binding antenuptial agreement in contemplation of
divorce or separation will be a guessing game in Pennsylvania. The
drafter of such an agreement has good reason to feel apprehensive
about future validity. Perhaps the only safe position is to draft the
agreement in accordance with the highly restrictive standards set
forth in Karkaria. However, if taken literally, Karkaria demands
that the draftsman have a crystal ball in order to foresee circum-
stances as they will exist when the parties seek to dissolve their
marriage and enforce the agreement. The impact of Karkaria upon
antenuptial agreements in Pennsylvania clearly remains unclear.
Marc L. Sternberger
to the circumstances of the parties take into account that each spouse contributes to the
prosperity of the marriage).
88. Karkaria, 136 P.L.J. at 170.
89. See Hofstein & Bell, supra note 11, at 50.
90. 551 A.2d 219 (1988).
91. The opinion in Karkaria was rendered on March 18, 1988, and the decision in
Simeone was filed seven months later on October 26, 1988.
92. Simeone, 551 A.2d at 223-24.
93. Id. at 222-24 (emphasis added)(relying on the plurality opinion in In re Estate of
Geyer, 516 Pa. 492, 503, 533 A.2d 423, 428 (1987)).
94. Id. at 225.
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